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Abstract 
Not necessarily the most appropriate defence of stakeholder interests can be found in the institutions 
and practice of corporate governance, other specific kinds of legal provisions can be more suitable. In 
the literature the issue of protection of stakeholder interests (of employees in particular) is generally 
considered in a static context: how should corporate governance be shaped in relation to existing 
firms, according in particular to some subjective criteria of fairness and fair play. But in order to exist 
and to reach a given dimension the firm must be first founded and grow. Thus the propensity to 
found a firm and finance and manage its growth, and therefore the supply of entrepreneurship, 
depend, among others, on the extent of founders’ and co-owners’ rights, and thus on the institutions 
of corporate governance. As shown by Hall and Soskice (2001) the latter, together with the different 
legal setups, result in different varieties of capitalism, such as broadly speaking the Anglo-Saxon or the 
continental-European variety, with different characteristics, advantages and disadvantages. Among the 
disadvantages of the continental European model, not considered by Hall and Soskice, are much 
higher rates of long-run unemployment. 
 
JEL Classification: P10, P48, G34, K22, K31 
Keywords: Stakeholders, Corporate Governance, Labour Market, Varieties of Capitalism 
 
1. Introduction and outline 
The notion of stakeholder applies, according to the interpretations, to those having a 
contractual relation with the firm, to those affected by the externalities generated by 
the firm, to those from whom the performance of the firm is affected. To the rather 
broad and vague notion of stakeholders correspond somewhat hazy notions of 
stakeholder theory and of the pursuit of stakeholder value. According to the 
instrumental, and rather non controversial view of stakeholder theory attention has 
to be paid by managers to the interests and incentives of all from whose activity the 
success of the firm depends. Aside from this particular viewpoint, the notion of 
stakeholder theory acquires ethical or ideological connotations, and the picture 
becomes rather blurred. As often remarked in the literature, the alleged pursuit of 
stakeholder interest can justify in practice lack of managerial accountability and 
                                               
1 Previous versions of the paper have been presented to the Conference on Rethinking Corporate 
Governance: From Shareholder Value to Stakeholder Value, Modena April 18-20, 2010, and to the 11-th Bi-
Annual Conference of the European Association for Comparative Economic Studies, Tartu August 
26-28, 2010. The present paper has been produced in the framework of common research project 
with Mirella Damiani, whom I have to thank for useful critical remarks, but who should by no means 
held responsible for its contents.  
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pathological interference by external organized interests (politicians in particular) in 
the actual running of the firm (what we may call at its worst the Alitalia syndrome). 
Moreover the issue of protection of stakeholder interests (of employees in particular) 
is generally considered in a static context: how should corporate governance be 
shaped in relation to existing firms (corporations in particular) and according to 
some subjective criteria of fairness and fair play. But in order to exist and to reach a 
given dimension the firm must be first founded and grow, and the propensity to 
found a firm and finance and manage its growth depends, among others, on the 
extent of founders’ and co-owners’ rights, and thus on the institutions of corporate 
governance (both in the legal system and in the practice of social interaction). The 
lesser those rights the lower will be presumably the founders’ interest in creating the 
firm and managing its growth. Instead of relying on managers under pressure from 
the social environment to pay attention to stakeholder interests (the Japanese model), 
a different way can be to ensure the formal representation of selected stakeholder 
interests (in particular of employees) in corporate boards (the German way). In the 
German framework this solution is accompanied by better than elsewhere 
cooperation between the social partners. Otherwise stakeholder representation in 
company boards may provide some kind of restraint on managerial irresponsibility in 
public companies, but can also lead to a possible alliance between employees and 
managers or blockholders to the disadvantage of other stakeholders (such as minority 
shareholders). Broadening the perspective, not necessarily the most appropriate 
defence of stakeholder interests can be found in the institutions of corporate 
governance, but in other kinds of legal provisions, such, as in the case of employees, 
in the labour code. At the same time the institutions of corporate governance and the 
labour code, instead of being substitutes in the protection of employees’ interests, in 
practice dovetail, leading to different varieties of capitalism, such as broadly speaking 
the Anglo-Saxon or the continental-European model. The different varieties have 
their overall advantages and disadvantages. In particular the protection of the interest 
of the employed insiders can be seen to be associated with a lower protection of the 
interest of the unemployed outsiders to be able to find an employment: the Anglo-
Saxon model leads in fact to lower protection of the stability of employment, but at 
the same time to lower long- run unemployment. In the Anglo-Saxon model the 
institutions of corporate control by the market are more active, while in practice the 
enhanced powers of managers of public companies collude in bringing about what 
may be perceived as excessive remunerations, in particular in the USA. In the 
continental model instead of excessive open remunerations there are the hidden 
benefits of control. In the end the choice between the different varieties of capitalism 
is a matter of taste and depends on the social context, while, unsurprisingly, the 
practical consequences of the legal framework depend on the specific characteristics 
of the social framework.  
2. Stakeholders, externalities and ethics 
The operation of firms in general, and of corporations in particular, affects the 
interests of many, either by commission or by omission. The legal and conventional 
prescriptions on who is empowered to decide on behalf of a company, the rules of 
decision, the way in which the legal documents concerning the life of the company, 
such as budget accounts, product information, different types of disclosures are 
formed and publicized deeply affect the way in which the different interests 
influenced by the activities of the company are impacted. At the same time the 
incentive structure that is created by these rules and the manner in which stakeholder 
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interests are affected influence the overall performance of firms and the economy. 
Among the different possible stakeholder interests that are impacted by what a firm 
does or omits to do the law distinguishes those that are relevant from those that are 
not, and prescribes the way the interests of the relevant stakeholders are to be 
considered and protected. This the law does implicitly, when it considers some 
external effects and ignores others. Indeed this is what the law does in general, since 
the effects of human behaviour are often numerous, far reaching and of diverse 
nature. For instance, turning to a very clear instance, albeit far from company law, 
modern Western family law ignores the external effects that the choice of a spouse 
produces for the rest of  the family (parents, in particular). But in other legal systems 
the consideration of these external effects are paramount and the matching decision 
is attributed to the parents and not to the spouses themselves.  
What are the criteria that guide the choice? There are a number of possible 
alternative considerations, political, ethical, ideological etc. However, turning back to 
company law, the most relevant issue concerns the overall economic consequences 
of alternative regulations, aside from the usual considerations of morality or desert, 
which would be mostly the domain of philosophers rather than economists. But even 
aside from any philosophical considerations it is obvious that those empowered to 
take decisions on behalf of the firm are expected, alike any other individual, not to 
pursue activities that run against widely shared moral principles (such as resorting to 
hold-ups or deceit--for instance it should be ethically inadmissible to knowingly 
deceive an employee about his effective career prospects just in order to extract 
greater effort from him--or, looking at more extreme possibilities, to murder, 
however perfect, or blackmail). As the American Law Institute (“Principles of 
Corporate Governance: Analysis and Recommendations”, Philadelphia, 1992, p. 82; 
quoted in Donaldson and Preston, 1995, p. 82) puts it: “the  absence of a legal 
obligation to follow ethical principles does not mean that corporate decisionmakers 
are not subject to the same ethical considerations as other members of society.” 
Concretely, the sanction to unethical behaviour, when not sanctioned by law, could 
be provided by social control through informal social sanctions, leading to loss of 
reputation. In the case of corporations this could bring about adverse publicity that 
could be very damaging for their public image and goodwill. Of course the extent to 
which this takes place depends on the specific social and political context, as 
appraised by that elusive concept, of social capital. On the other hand there could be 
some areas of uncertainty where moral and economic issues are blurred. In this area 
the moral judgment cannot be taken independently of the economic consequences of 
the rule that the judgment implies or proposes. For instance, for some it could seem 
unfair and immoral for a firm to dismiss some employees (seen as stakeholders) only 
because their employment is not profitable any more. The implied consequence of 
this assumed moral rule would be that this kind of behaviour should be made illegal. 
But what would be the economic consequences? The first is that the expected cost of 
employment would increase and, ceteris paribus, the demand for labour decrease, 
leading to lower wages and/or higher unemployment: in the end part of the cost of 
such a measure could fall on the additional unemployed, what does not seem very 
ethical. Then, if the burden of excessive employment leads to the demise of the firm, 
everybody loses eventually his job and the argument is obviously even stronger. 
Secondly, a mechanism leading to the allocation of labour where it is most 
productive would be blocked, with possible adverse consequences on productivity, 
wages and, again, employment. It is in this kind of blurred area, where ethical and 
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economic considerations appear to collide that economic reasoning could prove to 
be the most useful, aiding to form an ethical judgement based on the 
acknowledgement of the economic consequences of some assumed ethical rule, as 
translated into corresponding legislation. Of course ethical rules vary according to 
epochs and civilizations. Ethical rules that run against technological and economic 
progress lead to lesser increase in productivity and living standards. We have various 
examples of ethical rules based on religious beliefs that, even in our modern secular 
world, are hampering scientific and economic progress. Above all ethical convictions 
that clash with the basic foundations of a market economy (for instance, that any 
return to capital and enterprise is ethically unjustified being the consequence of 
“exploitation”, or that no employee should be ever dismissed) may bring about types 
of behaviour in contradiction with its thriving and progress. On the contrary some 
forms of general acceptance of its basic rules can enhance economic performance. 
But the rules of the game can vary from those of American liberal capitalism to those 
of the German social market economy. In the latter case the collaborative attitude of 
the social partners founded on the acceptance of the social market economy may 
contribute to explain the success of the German economy. 
3. Who are the stakeholders and how does the legal system take into 
account their interests?  
But then, who concretely are the stakeholders supposed to be? First of all those who 
have a contractual relation (either explicit or implicit) with the firm2, such as the 
employees, who are protected by the labour code, or the creditors, whose interests 
are protected by the civil code, together with the legal discipline of bankruptcy, and 
by the rules concerning the faithfulness and transparency of accounts.3 But the 
notion of stakeholders also implies some kind of consideration for interests that are 
outside specific legal protection and that should find some specific form of 
protection in the institutions of corporate governance.4 According to Freeman (1984) 
the notion of stakeholder extends to include “any group or individual who can affect 
or is affected by the achievement of an organization’s objectives” 5. At the same time 
the externalities that the operation of the company generates on people (possible 
“stakeholders”) who have no specific contractual relation with the firm enter in the 
scope of a number of legal provisions in defence of perceived public interests: such 
as environmental laws, public laws concerning the activities of the company relevant 
for local communities and public bodies, laws concerning the nature and quality of 
                                               
2 This is the notion of stakeholder in Freeman and Evan (1990, p. 354): according to them “the firm is 
best  conceptualized  as a set of multilateral contracts among stakeholders” where (p. 355) for them 
“’contract’ should be interpreted broadly to cover cases of ‘implicit contracts’”, and they “distinguish 
‘contract’ from one-shot exchanges and intend it to stand for ’multiple transactions’ that require 
some governance mechanisms.” 
3 As “sunshine is the best disinfectant” (Djankov et al., 2008, p. 436, echoing the famous sentence by 
Brandeis, 1914, ch. V: “Sunlight is said to be the best of disinfectants”). The transparency rules are 
of specific relevance  for creditors and for all sort of stakeholders, such as minority shareholders or 
contractors, and, obviously, for the fiscal authorities. 
4 The notion of stakeholders as such is rather vague. For a consideration of who could be considered 
as possible stakeholders see for instance Donaldson and Preston, 1995, pp. 85-86. 
5 Freeman, 1984, p. 46. It must be noted that the “affected” part was introduced by Freeman only 
because of the possibility that those affected by the organization would affect it in their turn. A 
previous definition by a 1963 memorandum of the Stanford Research Institute, quoted by Freeman 
(1984, p. 31) refers to “those groups without whose support the organization would cease to exist”, 
such as “shareowners, employees, customers, suppliers, lenders and society” (p.32), thus not much 
more restrictive, and very much in the perspective of strategic management.  
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goods the company produces, anti-trust laws, and last but not least the criminal law, 
for preventing all sorts of criminal behaviour that can be committed in managing a 
corporation. Owing to the above, one may wonder whether there is any specific 
motive why the interest of stakeholders and of the public in general should be 
protected by the legal provisions concerning corporate governance, rather than other 
specific pieces of legislation such as, for instance, in the case of employees, the 
provisions of labour law. At the same time the protection of the interest of 
shareholders, especially minority shareholders, who can be considered as a kind of 
special stakeholders since they are deprived in practice of decisional power (aside 
from exit) in a context in which information is not only imperfect, but fundamentally 
asymmetric, traditionally lies at the very heart of the issue of corporate governance.6 
4. The instrumental motive 
A first, but least interesting, approach to the stakeholder issue is the instrumental 
one, in the standard optics of business administration. The fact that managers should 
take into account the interest of all whose behaviour is of consequence for the 
survival and growth of the firm is an obvious platitude, which lies at the core of the 
instrumental approach to stakeholder theory. The stakeholder view of enterprise 
management expounded in Freeman (1984), predating by two years the fortunate 
book by Rappoport (1986) popularizing the notion of shareholder value (according  
to  which  the corporation must be run in the interest of shareholders, creating value 
on their behalf), is not necessarily in contradiction with the notion of shareholder 
value, since it refers to the stakeholder perspective as a chapter of strategic 
management. According to Freeman (1984) for the most effective pursuit of the 
objectives of the organization managers should pay due attention to all those who 
may contribute to its success, whatever the success criteria are supposed to be (thus 
including shareholder value). For example, the efficiency wage theory itself can be 
looked at from the viewpoint of the instrumental stakeholder theory of the firm. 
Other aspects of personnel management theory, such as how to shape the structure 
of pay or careers, may be seen in the same perspective: obviously a good manager 
should take into account the interests and preferences of the different stakeholders 
and the consequences of stakeholders’ behaviour on the attainment of the objectives 
of the firm (such as in particular profitability). But there is nothing particularly 
controversial about this. A more controversial and interesting aspect is the extent to 
which the various stakeholder interests should be taken into account per se, 
independently of their instrumental value.7 A particularly interesting problem 
concerns the overall economic consequences of different legal rules relating to 
corporate governance, and the way in which alternative systems of corporate 
governance, variously taking into consideration “stakeholder interests”, lead to 
different “varieties of capitalism”, and in particular the extent to which different rules 
and institutions aiming to the protection of stakeholders may be in a relationship of 
substitution or complementarity among themselves. 8 As shown in Hall and Soskice 
(2001), complementary prevails. In particular the rules of corporate governance and 
the provisions of labour law dovetail rather than alternate in the defense of perceived 
labour rights. If one considers also other aspects of corporate governance such as 
                                               
6 On this see in particular Shleifer and Vishny, 1997. 
7 For the consideration of the different possible aspects of stakeholder theory (descriptive, 
instrumental, normative, and managerial) and many references to the literature considering the 
different aspects, see Donaldson and Preston (1995). 
8 For the concept of institutional complementarities see for instance Armour and Deakin (2009). 
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those concerning the protection of minority shareholders, the degree of contestability 
of managerial powers and the discipline of financial markets one may arrive to the 
perception of two broad varieties of capitalism, Liberal Market Capitalism (of the 
Anglo-Saxon tradition) and Coordinated Market Capitalism (the continental 
European + Japanese tradition), with different advantages and disadvantages and 
various concrete results which also very much depend on the specific varieties and 
national characteristics of the countries concerned.9 
5. The founders’ and financiers’ perspective 
Many discussions on stakeholders vs. shareholders concern how an already existing 
corporation should be best organized in order to take the interest of stakeholders 
into account.10 But in order to function a company must first of all exist, and some 
measures which may appear to be justified having regard to the functioning of an 
already existing company can acquire a different perspective if the incentives and 
conditions relating to its founding are considered. A company arises from a contract 
between the partners. This is the consideration to start from. In the founders’ 
perspective we may adopt different viewpoints: how would the founders best 
formulate the statutes in their own interest? And how should the legislator constrain 
the formulation of the statutes from the perspective of the overall economic and 
social interests? In this the consequences on stakeholders should be taken into 
account, but also how the imposed legal constraints may impact on the incentives of 
the founders, and thus on a crucial decision affecting the supply of entrepreneurship: 
the decision to found a firm and to put one’s own invested resources at risk.11 Also: 
how do the rules and objective conditions governing the subsequent life of a firm, in 
particular the degree of consideration of stakeholders’ interests vs. the interest of 
shareholders, impact on the incentives to create the firm in the first place, and on the 
growth and further development of a firm? We may here provide an example:  the 
relative abundance of venture capitalists and of so called “investment angels” in the 
USA, which is by no means matched under European conditions,12 and which 
represents an important supply of crucial entrepreneurship,13 especially in 
technologically advanced and innovative firms, depends to a great extent on the 
relative ease by which a successful initiative can be cashed in by going public in a 
stock market endowed with depth and a great deal of liquidity, and a partnership be 
                                               
9 See Hall and Soskice (2001). For the quantitative aspects of the two main varieties and of their 
national variations see also Damiani (2010). 
10 As a clearcut example see Donaldson and Preston (1995), where the issue of stakeholder 
management is seen essentially as an ethical issue, without paying attention to the economic 
consequences of the different possible arrangements, and to the ethical implications of those 
consequences. What is remarkable of their thorough enquiry is that they do not consider the basic 
fact that a company in order to exist must be first be established, and that the founders-owners are 
the original shareholders. If the incentives they have for founding the company are insufficient, 
because, say, the law privileges the interest of stakeholders over those of shareholders, the company 
will not be founded and therefore will not exist, or will have a smaller dimension.  
11 An important aspect here is the extent of the complexity of the procedures needed to have a firm 
registered or a company incorporated. More exacting procedures can better guarantee some 
stakeholder interests that are affected by the company’s very existence, but have a cost in terms of 
the propensity to found a company and supply entrepreneurship and risk capital. 
12 Cf. OECD, 1998, pp. 18, 100. 
13 In particular “business angels”, who are as a rule experienced older entrepreneurs, not only are 
sharing in the USA in the entrepreneurial function of risk taking, but are involved in the assessment 
of entrepreneurial prospects and may variously affect the decisions relating to the running and 
development of the firm (cf. Chilosi, 2001, p. 329).  
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established in the first place, in an institutional environment in which “employment 
at will” prevails and the labour market is relatively unregulated.14 The depth and 
extent of the financial markets depend on the discipline of corporate governance, 
and especially on the extent of the protection of minority shareholders, more far-
reaching than elsewhere. The same conditions make much easier the solution to the 
problem of how to deal, for instance, with the time when the owners of a family firm 
decide that it is time to grow above or outside the family limits because of the 
momentum of the growth of the firm or because of demographic reasons. The legal 
constraints and the overall institutional environment affect the process through 
which a firm may be required to change its legal set-up in ways compatible with its 
growth, a process akin to molting in the natural world. So in order to determine the 
optimal setup of the rules that govern the life of the firm, in particular those that take 
into account the interests of the stakeholders, however defined, a dynamic approach 
should be taken, one that considers the possible development of the firm, from its 
birth and its growth, to its possible demise, without concentrating the attention on 
the static setup of an already existing firm, in particular a joint stock firm, at a certain 
moment of time, or even in a limited time span.15 Obviously, entrepreneurial 
incentives are affected not only by the regulations influencing the costs and timing of 
entry and the rules concerning corporate governance, but also by the overall 
institutional framework, in particular by the rules that regulate the employment 
contract that in some way dovetail with the discipline of corporate governance 
itself.16 
6. Haziness of the concept of stakeholder value  
The great disadvantage with stakeholder value (as the stakeholder approach is often 
referred to in the literature)17 as a guide to managerial behaviour, alternative to 
shareholder value, is the haziness of the concept, and of the basic concept of 
stakeholder itself. This applies also to the idea that the “management of the firm 
must be oriented to satisfying the interest of the entity itself, and not the interests of 
one of its constituents”.18 The idea that managers should be empowered and trusted 
to pursue stakeholder value (such as in Berle and Means’1932 approach, even if at 
the time the terminology was different) has the major flaw that stakeholders are 
many and their “values” indeterminate and undeterminable, just as the notion of the 
interest of the firm as such. This simply empowers the managers to do what they 
want independently of their agency relationships with the formal owners of the firm 
(the shareholders19), pretending that they are pursuing stakeholders’ interests.20 If 
                                               
14 According Ilmakunnas and others (1999, p. 1) the rate of entrepreneurship is negatively related to 
union power in the economy. Analogous considerations apply to the various forms of legal labour 
protection (cf. OECD, 1998, pp. 18–19). On the other hand stability of jobs engineered by labour 
protection could increase productivity by stimulating the accumulation of specific human capital and 
there could be some trade-off between job stability and remuneration (cf. Chilosi, 2001, p. 140).  
15 The institutional constraints imposed on the companies are usually dependent on the dimension, 
and in particular may be shaped so as to favour the start-ups. (But this can bring about some 
threshold problems.) 
16 On this see in particular Djankov, 2008. 
17 See in particular Charreaux and Desbrières, 2001, where the notion of stakeholder value is defined. 
18 Cf. Aglietta and Rebérioux, 2005, p. 46. 
19 There are some (such as Aglietta and Rebérioux, 2005) who doubt that shareholders should be 
considered the real owners of the firm, but only as providers of finance capital alike banks or 
bondholders. One may note however that their legal role is that of partners in a partnership, and one 
may hardly dispute the fact that the partners are legal owners of a business, even if in the different 
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managers are left as the interpreters and guarantors of stakeholders rights this can 
lead to a lot of haze in the assessment of managerial discretion and managerial 
results. In particular, enhancing managerial power may increase the power to skim 
the value created by the company to managers’ own benefit, while they can always 
pretend to have sacrificed the interest of shareholders to stakeholders’ interest.21 At 
the same time politicians, as a particular category of stakeholders, can benefit from 
the qui-pro-quo allowed by opaque arrangements with firms that have unclear 
objectives and possibly hazy budget constraints.22 And this can have a cost, in terms 
of lowering the interest of founders to found the company, of financiers to finance 
the company, of venture capitalists to launch venture capital initiatives with the 
prospect of being able to go public, and to have a return by going public for the 
more successful ventures, repaying the losses on the least successful. The fact, that 
we have already emphasized, is that the firm is established by the shareholders or 
partners. If the firm is supposed to pursue the interests of different parties 
(employees, local authorities, politicians etc.), rather than those of the partners, we 
may fairly assume that the interest in establishing and financing a firm assuming the 
relative risks is reduced and so is the potential supply of entrepreneurship.23 One 
could object that minority shareholders usually do not offer much entrepreneurship, 
they perform as financiers rather than as entrepreneurs.24 But whenever their rights 
are less guaranteed the depth of the financial market suffers, the extent to which 
firms are financed through bank credit rather than risk capital increases, the 
attractiveness of creating start-ups may decrease. Finally the formation of 
shareholder value is tantamount to the pursuit of the profitability of the firm. Profits, 
the difference of the value of what a firm produces and what is accounted as its cost, 
are the engine of the long-run growth of the firm, which may be seen both in the 
interest of shareholders as well as of the long interest of the economy, albeit with all 
the limitations and qualifications that are associated to the intrinsic imperfectly 
competitive nature of real market economies.25 The argument of proponents of the 
stakeholder views such as Charreaux and Desbrières (2001) is that enterprise’s costs 
are not social costs because they include variable amounts of surplus (such as 
employees’ surplus) and therefore are different from opportunity costs, and that a 
                                                                                                                                
partnerships and in the different legal systems the rights of the partners can be different, as well as 
the different partners’ decisional power in the running and development of the business. 
20 As Jensen (2001, p. 10) aptly puts it “stakeholder theory politicizes the corporation and leaves its 
managers empowered to exercise their own preferences in spending the firm’s resources.” 
21 Donaldson and Preston (1995, p. 87) are dismissive on this point observing that “the conventional 
model of the  corporation, in both legal and managerial forms, has failed to discipline self-serving 
managerial behavior.“ But if the consideration of the interest of stakeholders, instead of being 
trusted to managers’ interpretation, is taken care through the provisions concerning stakeholder 
representation in governing bodies (as considered in the following section), this could lead to a 
reduction of managerial discretion, rather than to an enhancement. 
22 Alitalia is a good case in point. In the case of Alitalia however the pathological consequences of 
stakeholder management were compounded  by public ownership of the controlling shares. As 
Gugler (p. 203) puts it, commenting a thorough review of the economic consequences of different 
set-ups of corporate governance, “the evidence concerning state ownership is on the negative site”. 
23 This is bound to have an impact on the labour market since demand for labour is intrinsically 
derivative from the supply of entrepreneurship (the activity of launching as well as that of running a 
firm). Increasing the supply of entrepreneurship and its quality (which, among others, depends on 
the incentives for entrepreneurs to perform effectively) enhances the capability of the economy to 
create and maintain jobs. See on this Chilosi, 2001, p. 328.  
24 This is stressed for instance by Aglietta e Rebérioux (2005). 
25 For the notion of shareholder value and its limitations see Chilosi, Damiani, 2007. 
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great deal of the surplus that is created or destroyed by the firm in its multifarious 
activities for its stakeholders is not accounted for. For instance, when a firm scales or 
shuts down, the costs saved are not really equal to the opportunity costs; only in the 
textbook model of the perfectly competitive economy is otherwise. In practice the 
local communities lose and workers lose the difference between their wages and their 
reservation wages. There in general a definitive surplus loss. This is not accounted 
for in its decision by the firm. What can be replied then is that concretely no better 
approximation to a firm’s social costs and contributions than that provided by its 
accounting seems to be possible and when proposing alternative rules of behaviour 
in society the implied structure of incentives and related economic consequences 
should be careful appraised. We may here propose what we may call the golden rule 
of rules: when a policy intervention is envisaged attention should be focused on the 
economic consequences of the rule that is implicitly asserted. For instance, should 
employment maintained at all costs? Should a firm ever be allowed to close a plant or 
layoff workers? Should employees entitled to appoint managers instead of 
shareholders? If these rule were accepted the negative consequences on productivity 
and employment could be far reaching. But if we are not ready to accept these rules 
in general should they be invoked either explicitly or implicitly in any single case? We 
may here also refer to the fallacy of composition. 
7. Stakeholder representation in the governing bodies 
A way for taking into consideration the interest of stakeholders (or rather of some of 
them), more plausible than to trust to managers the balancing of the different 
stakeholders’ interests, à la Berle and Means,26 is to have stakeholders’ (in particular 
employees’) interests to be represented in the governing bodies, and the balancing of 
some of the different shareholder and stakeholder interests to be the result of the 
internal organizational dynamics of the firm. The representation of stakeholder 
interests could be either spontaneously engineered by the controlling blockholders in 
choosing the board of directors (for instance by giving a seat to bank representatives, 
such as is often the case in the German governance system)27, or legally imposed.28  
7.1 Stakeholder representation and implicit contracts 
A motive for having stakeholder interests represented in corporate governance can 
be to provide a kind of guarantee for implicit contracts stipulated with the workforce, 
but also with other stakeholders, such as customers or suppliers (including banks, as 
credit and financial services suppliers), or local authorities and the state. By their very 
nature implicit contracts cannot normally be enforced through the courts. Moreover, 
since they are not explicit their content may be unclear, and assumed to be different 
                                               
26 According to  Berle  and  Means (1932, p. 356), managers should become “a purely neutral 
technocracy, balancing a variety of claims by various groups in the community and assigning to each 
a portion of the income stream on the basis of public policy rather than private cupidity”. For them 
“public policy” would be the outcome of a program set forth by “corporate leaders”, “for  example  
… comprising fair wages, security to employees, reasonable service to their public, and stabilization 
of business” (p. 356). This conception could find an institutional counterpart in the Japanese 
corporate governance system, where there is no formal legally prescribed stakeholder interest 
representation, but informally directors are bound to take care of a bundle of complex stakeholders 
interests. The Japanese articulate framework of strong social control may have been able to keep 
arbitrary managerial power in check. 
27 For the literature debating the relevance of the presence of bank representatives in supervisory 
boards of German corporations see Fauver and Fuerst, pp. 680-81.  
28 For a synthetic survey of the way in which concretely these kinds of arrangements are produced not 
only in Germany, but in a number of other countries see Allen et al. (2009), pp. 7-8. 
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by the different parties involved. Thus it may be difficult to realize whether and to 
what extent they are fulfilled or not. Thus it may be appropriate that they may be 
protected through stakeholder representation such as in company boards or works 
councils, where some kind of general consensus on interpretation and 
implementation may be reached through communications by the representatives of 
the parties involved. This kind of representation would not necessarily be contrary to 
the interest of the owners in general, and of the founders in particular, because it 
could save on the cost and time of building trust, and expectation of implicit 
contracts compliance. The implicit assets and liabilities in relation to stakeholders and 
the way in which they are expected to be honoured should be reflected to some 
extent in goodwill, and thus in the net value of the firm.  
7.2 Stakeholder representation as a control and collaboration 
device  
On the positive side employees’ representation in company boards could bring about 
some additional supervision of managerial behaviour that, because of the specific 
information that employees have on the running of the companies, may also turn out 
to the advantage of non controlling shareholders, especially in case the employees 
who are represented are also shareholders:29 the informational exchange that 
employees’ representation may bring about could be to shareholders’ advantage 
because it could favour better informed managerial decisions and a more 
collaborative climate of industrial relations reducing the probability of industrial 
actions.30 The credible sharing of information ensured by codetermination could 
make wage claims reductions and worse working conditions acceptable in case of 
enterprise difficulties. Thus decentralized bargaining at the firm level in particular 
could take place in an atmosphere of greater trust, and Pareto improving agreements 
can be struck more easily. This has been recently the case in Germany’s metal 
industry, where workers have accepted increases in work hours at unchanged pay in 
exchange for continuous employment guarantees following the Pforzheim agreement 
of 2004 (“mainly targeted at reducing costs at company level, for instance, through 
an increase in the duration of working hours while freezing or cutting wages”, 
leading to “controlled decentralization”).31 But there is also the possibility that insider 
workers and managers could collude against shareholder interests, especially of 
minority and disperse shareholders.32 According to a number of inquiries considering 
governance systems where some employee representation in corporate boards is 
legally required, unless it does not exceed some threshold (say, one third of seats) 
                                               
29 “Labor representation introduces a highly informed monitor to the board that reduces managerial 
agency costs (such as shirking, perk-taking, and excessive salaries) and private beneﬁts of 
blockholder control” (Faver and Fuerst, p. 680). As a matter of fact, according to the inquiry of 
Ginglinger et al. (2009) on French companies  “directors  elected  by employee shareholders 
unambiguously increase  firm  valuation  and  profitability”. There are some studies (cf. Coles et al. 
2008), that show that insider directors may be beneficial to value creation, especially in high tech 
firms. But these refer to directors who are freely appointed rather than appointed on the basis of 
outside legal compulsion. 
30 Cf. Fauver and Fuerst (2006), p. 673. 
31 Ilsøe (2010).  
32 In the case of the German Mitbestimmung the power of insiders finds a limit in the countervailing 
power of strong blockholders. The theoretical and empirical literature on the overall economic 
consequences of the German Mitbestimmung in particular, and of codetermination and of employee 
stock ownership and “voice” in general appears to lead to complex and partially contradictory 
results. For a synthetic updated survey see Ginglinger et al., 2009, pp.5 f. 
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employee representation appears to be beneficial for the creation of firm value.33 We 
can wonder then why forms of employee representation have to be made 
compulsory at all, as they appear to be in the interest of shareholders too, and thus 
one would expect to be included in the internal organization of companies even 
without legal external compulsion. But as remarked by Jensen and Meckling (1979, p. 
473), “A striking fact about industrial democracy is that it cannot be effected on any 
significant scale voluntarily. Without fiat, codetermination would be virtually 
nonexistent.” This makes the case for legally mandated codetermination if it can be 
shown that through its favourable external effects social partners could avoid being 
stuck in otherwise sub-optimal Nash equilibria, or because of some presumed overall 
favourable consequences on the complex organization of society and the economy. 
One of the possible advantages of codetermination, as well as of profit participation 
remuneration schemes, could be to have an additional party interested in the 
publicity and faithfulness of the accounts, and in reigning in top managers’ 
compensation, to the advantage both of fairness, reduced inequalities, and even of 
efficiency, since “lean cats may run faster than fat cats”.34 At the same time a single 
firm engaging in co-determination when the others do not could be negatively 
affected.35 Among the externalities that systems of employee representation generate 
we could consider the pursuit of overall macroeconomic social and economic 
objectives such as in the architecture of the German social market system. The social 
compact implicit in the latter enhances the opportunities for macroeconomic 
collaboration between social partners, while at the same time microeconomic 
efficiency objectives are on the whole not jeopardized in the process, at least in firms 
where participation of insiders to the supervisory board is not too large. But, 
depending on the social and economic setup there is always the possibility that at the 
macroeconomic level the enhancement of the protection of the interest of 
represented stakeholders, insiders in particular, could turn to the disadvantage of 
some weaker segments of society, such as consumers, or the unemployed, as a 
consequence of the enhancement of the interest of the insiders in relation to 
outsiders (for instance by pushing for higher wages and better working conditions, 
reducing the opportunities for increasing employment). But this kind of outcome 
could be also the consequence of any other measure aimed at the protection of 
insiders, such as that provided in particular by the labour law. 
8. Workers’ representation vs. labour code protection 
Indeed, not necessarily the best protection of the legitimate interests of stakeholders 
may be sought in the architecture of corporate governance, some other legal 
provisions could be more suitable. For instance if the defense of the interests of 
insider workers and of their firm-specific investment36 is sought through employees’ 
                                               
33 Cf. Allen et al. (2009), pp. 26-27. 
34 Cf. Chilosi, Damiani (2007), p. 10. The reason is in the potentially negative income effect of higher 
salaries on effort. For the markedly higher remuneration of top managers in relation to that of 
manual workers in the UK and especially in the USA in relation to Germany and Japan where forms 
of stakeholder control formally or informally apply see Towers Perrin (2005). According to a 
different view the high open remuneration of American top managers are matched elsewhere by the 
hidden advantages of control obtained through fraudulent means, and allowed by the lower 
protection of minority shareholders, as borne out by the much higher price associated to the 
transfers of control packets of shares (cf. Dyck and Zingales, 2004).  
35 Cf. Fauver and Fuerst, 2006, p. 679. 
36 The issue of firm specific investment is often emphasized to justify employees’ legal protection and 
internal labour markets. However the argument is not entirely persuasive. It is difficult to envisage 
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representation in works councils or enterprise boards instead than through the 
protection of the labour code this does not guarantee any given employee since, even 
omitting the possibility that the representatives be “captured” by the interest of 
management or of the owners, employees’ representatives may well act in defense of 
a subset of the work force rather than of the work force as a whole. Labour law may 
be in this respect a better instrument, since it protects everybody’ rights in an 
employment contract.. Co-determination on the other hand can be the counterpart 
of a social bargain struck between the different social components (in particular trade 
unions and employers) at the political level towards exchangin some institutional 
protection of insiders (which could also favourably affect employment stability and 
overall working conditions), with some overall political and social consensus and 
wage moderation, reducing the restrictive consequences on employment that one 
could otherwise expect from the protection of insider interests. This may be the 
essence of the German social market system enhancing collaborative rather than 
conflictual social propensities between the different social partners, with overall 
better macroeconomic results than in other, more conflictual, environments. But one 
may speculate the extent to which this is the outcome of specific corporate 
governance institutions or instead of the specific social, political and national 
context.37  
9. Insiders, outsiders and long-term unemployment 
Privileging the interest of entrenched insiders, such as blockholders and existing 
employees, through the institutions of corporate governance and through the labour 
code, can go against the interest of outsiders, such as would-be employees and 
minority shareholders. Protection of the interest of insider workers limits the 
mechanism that in a market economy, however very imperfectly, tends to shift 
labour wherever in the economy its productivity is higher. The countries (such as 
Italy, Germany or France) where the protection of insiders is higher are also 
characterized by a markedly higher rate of long-run unemployment than the UK or 
USA, where protection of insiders is lower.38 On the other hand some workers, even 
                                                                                                                                
any acquired skills that could not be used at least in some other firms of the same industry, except in 
the case of monopoly or strong market power, such as specific skills required by the state 
administration, or in state railways, or in IBM in its heydays. Firm specific investment appears rather 
to be concentrated at the beginning of the employment relationship: for instanced the cost of 
moving, of learning the rules and habits of the firm, to get knowing one’s new colleagues, etc. An 
additional investment could be related to imperfect information, and the information about the 
employees that the firm acquires in the course of employment. Thus the worker can invest in 
acquiring goodwill and reputation inside the firm which could not be easily transferable outside. But 
the investment is reciprocal: the firm too invests in acquiring specific information as to the quality of 
the worker and has an interest in protecting this specific investment as well as past investment in 
training. This is a protection against unfair dismissals that occurs even without any specific legal 
protection. Moreover as long as moving to another firm is costly for the worker, some degree of 
investment by the firm in generic training is justified. 
37 The specific national context of Denmark enhancing overall trust in industrial relations is 
emphasized by Ilsøe (2010). 
38 For the data on long-run unemployment in the different countries the reader is referred to the 
OECD data included in the ILO database, such as reported in the KILM 6th edition, freely accessible 
and downloadable from the ILO Internet site. In the ten years 1999-2008, for instance, the average 
long run rates of unemployment (where long-run unemployment is defined as unemployment of one 
year or longer) were as follows: USA 0.5; UK 1.3; Germany 4.7; France 3.4; Italy 4.7. One may note 
from the data that in the USA, where the labour market is particularly flexible and “employment at 
will” prevails both the rate and the incidence of long run unemployment are particularly low, much 
lower than in European countries such as Germany, France, and Italy where the rigidities of the 
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the unemployed, if given the choice, may prefer a setup where the labour market is 
more rigid, unemployment higher and the probability for the unemployed to find a 
job lower, possibly labour productivity and average wages lower, but once a job is 
found employees enjoy legal protection and a lifetime employment prospect, and 
thus greater peace of mind. 39 
10. Politicians as carers for stakeholders’ interests40 
Another view of stakeholder governance can be to entrust stakeholder interests to 
the protection of the political establishment and public powers, formally (such as 
through golden shares) or informally, through political influence exerted, for 
instance, through the leverage of publicly owned banks, or through public regulatory 
capacity. The record on this account does not seem on the whole brilliant. Often, 
even when not directed to milking resources for the pursuit of petty political 
interests, government interventions for defending the interest of stakeholders aim, in 
continental Europe in particular, to stimulate those decisions by firms that lead to 
higher employment, but especially to restrain the decisions that bring about 
employment reductions. Instances are the recent of encroachment by the German 
government on the destiny of the Opel GM subsidiary and that of the Italian 
government on Fiat’s decision to close the Termini Imerese production plant, or the 
pluriannual Italian costly drama concerning the destiny of Alitalia. Interferences of 
this kind may have negative consequences both on the allocation of scarce financial 
and human resources and on entrepreneurial incentives, even if prima facie they may 
seem to be justified by serious social and public order concerns and by the 
consideration of the short run difference between private and social costs. In 
appraising this kind of policy actions one should take into account, as argued above, 
the overall consequences of the general rules that are implicitly asserted, such as: 
<<the closure of any given plant, however unprofitable, should not be permitted>>, 
or <<the government should always do whatever it is in its power to avoid layoffs, 
even at the cost of covering the losses>>. The consequences of following such kind 
of rules on the propensity to invest in new initiatives, to hire, and to open new 
plants, to maintain profitability, and on the use of scarce budgetary resources can be 
                                                                                                                                
labour market are higher and, in the case of Germany and France, insider representation in corporate 
boards is mandated. The UK, while having a long-run unemployment rate higher than in the USA 
presents a much lower rate than in the three continental countries. Of course other factors could be 
relevant here, such as the extent of unemployment benefits. But the latter are different in the 
different countries considered (higher in Germany, but also in the UK, in relation to Italy, for 
instance, were they are particularly low). In general the comparison (such as in Hall and Soskice, 
2001, p. 20) is made in terms of overall unemployment rates, but it is long run unemployment that 
represent the main source both of economic waste and of social suffering. Moreover if, as in the 
LMEs, there is greater flexibility in the labour market and greater propensity to change jobs, this 
leads to higher rates of frictional employment, which can be seen as functional to the greater 
dynamism of the labour market. The greater capability of the LMEs to create jobs (albeit on average 
less durable and with greater income inequalities) may be reflected in the higher full-time equivalent 
employment rate in relation to the CMEs (as shown in Hall and Soskice, 2001, p. 22). The above 
however does not apply to Japan, which has both a very high full-time equivalent employment rate 
and a very low long-run unemployment rate. But Japan in many respects is a case apart. 
39 A possible downside of such a setup from workers’ viewpoint may be the danger to end up trapped 
in a less preferred and less rewarding job than under an alternative, more flexible and less legally 
constrained system, owing to the greater risk of leaving one’s job and the difficulty in finding, once 
unemployed, a different, more suitable, job. More generally, labour market regulation weakens the 
allocative mechanism expounded by the hedonic theory of wages. 
40 On the political determinants of the degree of shareholder and employment protection, according 
to the nature of the electoral system, see Pagano, Volpin (2005).  
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easily guessed. Moreover we have here an obvious case where there is contradiction 
between the protection of insiders and the interest of outsiders, such as workers 
whose opportunities of finding an employment is thwarted by the misallocation of 
economic resources and the reduction of entrepreneurial incentives, taxpayers who 
are financing the subsidies for loss-making plants, recipients of social expenditure or 
social services whose supply is curtailed because of the alternative use of financial 
resources, etc. But in these cases the insiders are known, the outsiders are 
undetermined, and this, psychologically and politically makes a lot of difference. 
Moreover there is the well known fact that politicians are often prone to be captured 
by organized interests rather than be guided by the long term consequences of their 
policy actions. 
As an instance of the fallacy of composition, rules apparently in favour of some 
stakeholders do not necessarily have favourable consequences on the category to 
which the stakeholders belong. For instance, security of tenure in employment may 
have important productivity consequences (by limiting incentives and blocking an 
important mechanism for reallocating resources where they may be more productive) 
that may turn against workers’ living standards and opportunities of employments. 
Or, going to a theoretical extreme, a rule empowering employees instead of 
shareholders to appoint a controlling majority of directors would go to the 
disadvantage of workers in general: such a rule could respond to the ethical principles 
of someone, but would be disastrous for the category the rule itself would seem to 
protect. Who would invest, create firms and jobs under those circumstances?  
At the same time the diffusion and approval itself of stakeholder theory aiming at the 
defence of stakeholder interests as opposed to value creation may work as a powerful 
ideological instrument for favouring special interests, such as of managers wishing to 
escape the constraints of the market for corporate control, or of politicians wishing 
to exert political power and influence though their interference in the running of 
firms, to the detriment of the general interest. 
11. Conclusion 
In the end one should be always aware that the economic consequences of 
alternative legal disciplines in the different institutional and social contexts may be 
quite different.41 In particular this applies to the mix of formal rules affecting 
corporate governance and those affecting stakeholder interests, in particular those 
regulating the labour market, in their interaction with the informal rules 
characterizing the social framework.  
                                               
41 One may refer here as an extreme case to the disastrous consequences of the introduction of some 
capitalist market institutions, especially in the corporate and financial area, in Russia after the demise 
of the URSS. 
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